All Reports

Federal control of Mekelle is confirmed, but the war did not stop with the fall. Abiy's short-war bet now meets a fragile economy, a hardening Red Sea front — and overnight strikes that prove the longer war has begun.

Flávio Bolsonaro finished ahead of an incumbent president for the first time in Brazil's democratic history — and every final poll missed it. Twenty days from the runoff, the contested-election scenario is not receding: it is the plan.

The CPC puts a very strong El Niño at over 90% for winter 2026–27, with 75% odds of the strongest index reading on record. This assessment maps what that means in board-level terms: a Peruvian anchoveta quota already cut 36%, the Panama Canal's dry-season floor converging with the closure of Hormuz, three Andean grids rationing on the same drought, and food-led inflation arriving ahead of the meteorological peak. Three dated scenarios through Q2 2027 for organisations sourcin

European gas storage 2026 begins the heating season at its thinnest level in fifteen years. Not a shortage of molecules — a geopolitical premium attached to every one of them. The October–November injection curve decides the price.

As the Kordofan Sudan offensive 2026 cracks Al-Mazroub and opens the road to Darfur, the UN Security Council races its 9 October deadline to vote on a nationwide arms embargo.

Taiwan's first F-16V delivery arrived 2 October — 2 of 66 jets, three years behind schedule — into the quietest PLA air activity since 2024. The signal isn't the aircraft: it's Beijing's silence, and the punishment exercised only when Washington moves next.

A fatal BSF encounter on the Punjab international border — the first lethal incident outside Kashmir since the May 2025 ceasefire — is testing crisis-management architecture that was never built for this frontier. The guardrails hold on the Line of Control; the Punjab border runs on legacy policing procedures, and both governments are pre-writing the record of the next encounter.

Robots made ground cheap around Lyman; Moscow's answer makes cities costly. As Kyiv doubles its refinery campaign, the fifth winter becomes an endurance race between two collapsing infrastructures.

The 29 September 2026 inauguration of the China-Laos Military Joint Support and Training Center gives Beijing three disclosed overseas military outposts — and its first centred on air power. This assessment maps the continental arch from Laos to Cambodia to Myanmar, the debt substrate financing it, and the operational risk vectors for organisations with Mekong-corridor exposure.

Updated 3 Oct 2026 — Ethiopia was not destabilised in 2026; it fractured: seven armies allied in September, at war by the 23rd, severed from Eritrea and Egypt by the 1st of October. Our August stagnation scenario is dead; the updated assessment runs three scenarios to mid-2027, from federal containment to a regionalised cascade.

Updated 3 Oct 2026 — Taiwan was not invaded in 2026; it was encircled: quarantined from June, tested through September's stalemate summit, and priced by an insurance market that can read a coast guard patrol as accurately as a missile. Our August grey-zone momentum scenario has held; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through Q4 2027.

The November 2026 elections are not a domestic event — they are a geopolitical instrument. CES Intelligence maps how the Iran conflict, Strait of Hormuz oil shocks, and sanctions architecture synchronize with Washington's electoral calendar. Three calibrated scenarios, probabilities, and actionable implications for organisations exposed to energy, defence, and sanctions risk.

Updated 2 Oct 2026 — Europe's energy security was not solved in 2026; it was repriced: anchored in oil above $90, enforced at 632 designated vessels, and rebuilt on Chinese inverters. Our July managed-three-track thesis held — barely; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through 2030.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — Pakistan was not destabilised in 2026; it was leveraged: sworn into the Mecca pact in August, tested by Houthi strikes in September, and held together by a mediation it cannot exit. Our threshold-state framework holds; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through the 2027 fighting season.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — The Mecca Defence Pact 2026 institutionalised in eight weeks, then failed its first test in ninety. Istanbul's committee meets, Riyadh's secretariat staffs, but the Article 5 clause never fired when Houthis burned Jazan again. Our hedging scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three rebased scenarios for Q4 2026–Q3 2027.

Updated Oct 1, 2026 — The Philippines was not attacked in 2026; it was worn down: baton-struck in July, obstructed by navy warships in September, governed by an elite too consumed by impeachment to respond. Our August stress scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through Q2 2027.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — The Ukraine Russia War 2026 did not freeze with the summer's diplomacy: it compounded. The Kremlin's end-of-year deadline for Donetsk is now assessed as missed; a fuel crisis once dismissed as episodic has become the war's decisive asymmetric weapon; and a Duma supermajority has been installed precisely to authorise whatever October requires. Our July forgotten-theatre thesis has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through the Q4 2026 m

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — Venezuela was not rescued in 2026; it was repossessed: decapitated in January, refinanced in August, proceduralised in September. The zombie state now has equity holders, and the talks that were meant to end it have converted the opposition into a signatory. Our July scenario has come true in the details as well as the direction; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2028–2030 transition window.

Updated 30 Sep 2026 — Yemen was not rescued in 2026; it was conquered without conquest: the coast seized, the corridor priced at 3%, the Mecca pact untested. Our August offshore scenario has moved into the air domain; the updated assessment rebases probabilities through Q1 2027.

Updated 29 Sep 2026 — China was not stabilized in 2026; it was deferred: truce extended by sixty days, its two most senior generals expelled from the Party in September, and a Party Congress calendar that compresses every risk vector into one window. Our three scenarios have been recalibrated; the updated China 2026 geopolitical risk assessment runs the corridor from the January 10 truce expiry to the 2027 Party Congress.