All Reports

Chinese firms control more than 80 percent of Zimbabwe's lithium and virtually all of it ships to one destination. The February 2026 export freeze tripled revenue — and institutionalised the dependency it claimed to end. Three scenarios to January 2027 and beyond, with compliance calendars, fiscal thresholds and the succession clock priced in.

Sovereignty in Laos is not eroding — it is being liquidated asset by asset. This assessment maps how Chinese debt deferrals, a 25-year grid concession, the Ban Keun airbase and the Mekong dam cascade converted a state's core functions into a schedule of collateral, and what that means for board-level exposure.

Six days separate Trump's "massive" Greenland exploration pledge from the EU's renewed Arctic drilling ban. Two allied doctrines now claim the same subsurface — and only one controls the market that would price the other's claim.

China Q3 2026 GDP growth of 4.5% is real but rented: exports replaced the domestic engines Beijing cannot repair, and the resulting $938 billion surplus is now the country's principal geopolitical exposure.

The FIMA repo facility is barely used, and that is exactly the point. By demanding a review of Hong Kong's access to it, Congress has turned a dormant crisis instrument into a political permit — and the Hong Kong dollar peg's crisis assumptions are now on Washington's clock. Effective exclusion within the quarter is unlikely (20-40%); the repricing by counterparties is highly likely (80-95%).

Updated 19 Oct 2026 — Indonesia was not destabilised in 2026; it was sedated: a monopoly announced in May, diluted by August, relaunched as a monitoring grid in September. Our August wager stands, but its mechanics have changed — $105 oil has broken the subsidy math and MSCI has proposed ejecting the market from the emerging universe. This updated Indonesia 2026 geopolitical risk assessment runs three scenarios for Q1–Q3 2027.

Milei's Argentina 2027 budget is an electoral instrument disguised as a fiscal document — its assumptions will be arbitrated by a sovereign market that has stopped pricing past October 2027.

Updated 13 Oct 2026 — South Africa was not rescued in 2026; it was repriced: coalition intact but fraying, impeachment frozen not dead, a tariff wall rebuilt on three legal instruments. Our managed-decline baseline holds at 40–45%; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through Q2 2027.

Updated 12 Oct 2026 — Nigeria was not collapsed in 2026; it is being contained: four security fronts fracturing simultaneously, the Dangote Refinery capping upside through a 22% feedstock gap, an ECOWAS anchor cracking as Russia's Africa Corps embeds on the northern border. Our July one-party drift hypothesis has materialised; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2027 electoral checkpoint.

Updated 9 Oct 2026 — Mexico was not destabilised in 2026; it was compressed: cartel-decapitated in February, downgraded in May, bilaterised in July, and still paying for nearshoring investment it physically cannot host. Our dependency-trap thesis has hardened; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for the 2027 USMCA endgame through the 2028 transition.

Updated 8 Oct 2026 — Egypt's Suez revenue did not collapse in 2026; it was re-financed by the war that severed it: struck at Damietta in July, rescued by rerouted Gulf crude in August, encircled by its own doctrine in October. Our August call on the Houthi and New Alamein triggers has partially fired; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through Q2 2027.

Turkey's unlicensed solar capacity now exceeds 22.5 GW, with distributed self-consumption accounting for 89% of 2025 additions. The build-out accelerates as Antalya prepares to host COP31 in November 2026. CES DAILY SIGNAL — OCTOBER 8, 2026 Bids close on 13 October for the country's 2026 renewable auction round — 2.4 GW of wind and solar offered since July — twenty-seven days before the Antalya Expo Center opens COP31 to the world's climate diplomats (Ministry of Energy and N

Mexico's 2027 budget delivers two decimals of deficit reduction — 4.1% to 3.9% of GDP — without new taxes, by withdrawing 70% of state support to Pemex on the strength of a war-driven oil rally. The IMF calls the adjustment too slow, Moody's negative outlook waits on execution, and the USMCA clock runs in parallel. Calibrated analysis of what the assumptions cost.

The CPC puts a very strong El Niño at over 90% for winter 2026–27, with 75% odds of the strongest index reading on record. This assessment maps what that means in board-level terms: a Peruvian anchoveta quota already cut 36%, the Panama Canal's dry-season floor converging with the closure of Hormuz, three Andean grids rationing on the same drought, and food-led inflation arriving ahead of the meteorological peak. Three dated scenarios through Q2 2027 for organisations sourcin

European gas storage 2026 begins the heating season at its thinnest level in fifteen years. Not a shortage of molecules — a geopolitical premium attached to every one of them. The October–November injection curve decides the price.

Updated 29 Sep 2026 — China was not stabilized in 2026; it was deferred: truce extended by sixty days, its two most senior generals expelled from the Party in September, and a Party Congress calendar that compresses every risk vector into one window. Our three scenarios have been recalibrated; the updated China 2026 geopolitical risk assessment runs the corridor from the January 10 truce expiry to the 2027 Party Congress.

CES Intelligence's Djibouti 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps a system that sells security to great powers — eight military tenants, $300M annual rent, a succession vacuum at age 78, and a corridor defection risk from Ethiopia. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and actionable implications for maritime, defence, and sovereign-exposure portfolios.

Cambodia has not surrendered its sovereignty to China — it has converted it into a subscription service. This Cambodia 2026 Geopolitical Risk Assessment maps the pricing: PLAN corvettes at a Chinese-built pier, a $1 billion Exim loan sealing the Funan Techo canal, elections pre-decided by lawfare, and a scam crackdown selective enough to reprice the country without touching its sponsors. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and the four bellwethers boards should watch b

First oil is a political event before it is fiscal. The landlocked republic's EACOP corridor, dual executive, and ADF flank converge in October 2026.

Updated September 22, 2026 — The $40 billion backstop no longer exists as advertised: a Treasury swap stands, a bank facility was shelved, a repo replaces the rest. Milei's fiscal surplus meets 2027's debt wall. Our July assessment has matured: three scenarios run through the 2027 election while Brazil institutionalises the rupture, the Falklands lever moves to statute, and corruption dockets acquire forensic texture.