All Reports

The February 2026 Iran war was the first live audit of the Emirati model: a 90% collapse in Jebel Ali throughput, licence-free US AI chips granted weeks later, and secondary sanctions closing in on the Gulf entrepôt. This UAE geopolitical risk assessment maps the couplings — chokepoints, chips, water and demography — and prices three scenarios for 2027.

Political stability is being monetised while the debt becomes the eurozone's largest. This Italy 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps the Mediterranean pivot's fault lines: Qatari LNG under force majeure, the PNRR post-grant cliff, 350,000 SMEs facing the ETS2 cliff, and a 2027 calendar where energy, election and fiscal file converge. Three scenarios, quantified exposure baselines, and board-level implications.

The ceasefire ended the Houthi campaign in November 2025 — yet Bab al-Mandeb transits still run at half their pre-crisis level. Why hasn't traffic returned? This Suez Canal 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps the recovery as it actually is: tanker-led and war-shaped, constrained by charterparty inertia, insurance ratchets and a record orderbook that makes carrier patience profitable. Three scenarios to 2027.

Four FPSOs, 900,000 barrels a day, and a verdict from The Hague due between November 2026 and January 2027. The ICJ ruling will either settle the Essequibo question or weaponise it — this report maps the three trajectories, the war-risk repricing mechanism, and what boards must sequence before Q4.

Updated 15 Sep 2026 — Japan was not protected in 2026; it was besieged: rare earths zeroed since November, LNG secured by a waiver with an expiry date, deterrence priced against a ¥135.8 trillion refinancing schedule. Our July attrition baseline holds; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for the December security rewrite and the 2027 constitutional cycle.

Updated 15 Sep 2026 — Nicaragua was not defeated by sanctions in 2026; it was foreclosed: elections abolished in July, a Russian military pact ratified with jurisdictional immunity in May, a Chinese port hub operational on the Pacific. The fortress holds while American bandwidth is spent elsewhere; this updated assessment runs three scenarios through the 2028 hardening window.

The Bahamas and Jamaica are not peripheral tax havens — they are functioning contamination vectors. This CES Intelligence assessment reveals how drug-corruption corridors plug directly into the US correspondent banking system, with three scenarios through Q3 2027.

Updated 14 Sep 2026 — The Arctic was not opened in 2026; it was repossessed: 42 Russian icebreakers against two American hulls, $6.82 billion in EU LNG payments funding Moscow's war machine, and an alliance fractured by Washington's own Greenland claim. Our July sustained-dominance scenario is materialising on schedule; the updated geopolitical risk assessment runs three scenarios from the January 2027 embargo to the 2028 icebreaker gap.

Updated 13 Sep 2026 — The 26 June Trilateral Framework survived its own expiry but failed to resolve what it postponed. Disarmament and ceasefire have been decoupled; the economy contracted 6.4% after a 4.2% recovery in 2025; UNIFIL's mandate expires on 31 December. Our July assessment has been updated with three pathways for Q4 2026 through the 2028 transition: containment drift, escalation spiral, and intra-state fracture.

Updated 14 Sep 2026 — Brazil was not holding an election in 2026; it was collecting rent on great-power competition: tariffs locked in July, China negotiations accelerated in August, and a Supreme Court probe opened three weeks before the vote. Our July baseline has recalibrated to a statistical tie; the update runs three scenarios through the 2027 transition.

Updated 14 Sep 2026 — Cuba was not defeated in 2026; it was switched off: the grid at cold-start threshold, the negotiation track dead since 7 September, and the oil lifelines contractually sealed by the US–Venezuela deal. Our July sustained-pressure baseline still holds; the updated assessment runs three scenarios from the 24 September Trump–Xi summit through mid-2027.

Updated 14 Sep 2026 — The canal was not blocked in 2026; it was narrowed: capped in September, coerced through its registry, litigated for $3.5 billion. Our July transit-reduction call has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through Q1 2027.

Eighty ships boarded in the Singapore Strait in 2025 — the worst year since 1991. Beneath the world's busiest chokepoint, a corridor where sanctioned oil, criminal syndicates, and submarine survey grids share the same two shipping lanes. The Malacca Strait's risk architecture, stress-tested.

Chad 2026 is not a weak state; it is an over-subscribed one. This Chad 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps a garrison state where jihadist administrations out-tax governments, an Emirati air bridge feeds Sudan's war, and national solvency hangs from a single pipeline. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and implications for logistics, energy and compliance exposure across the Lake Chad Basin.

The gold card is real: a completed IMF programme, a record harvest and a currency that defied gravity. But Accra's recovery is collateralised by a single commodity, a diseased tree and an unguarded border. This Ghana 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps the margin between investability and relapse — with three probability-weighted scenarios for boards.

An economy growing at 6.5% behind a garrison border, a cocoa account cut 57%, and a succession with no mechanism: this Ivory Coast geopolitical risk assessment maps the anchor state's fault lines through 2028 — three calibrated scenarios, tactical implications, and the variables boards should watch before December's EUDR gate.

Incident counts are at thirty-year lows, yet the kidnapping economy is intact, the security is rented, and the gulf's true integration runs below the waterline. A theatre-level assessment of West African energy's most consequential corridor.

Updated 10 Sep 2026 — The Sahel was not stabilized in 2026; it was monetised: Russia's Africa Corps crushed a Niamey mutiny on 29 August, Niger's uranium permit moved to a state vehicle, and the first EU return-hub model landed on 5 September. Our July regime-protection thesis has come true; this Sahel 2026 geopolitical risk assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2028 consolidation window.

Updated 10 Sep 2026 — The Indian Ocean was not destabilised in 2026; it was re-priced: Hormuz conditioned rather than closed, six vessels hijacked, 60% of India's Europe-bound data riding two chokepoints. This updated Indian Ocean 2026 geopolitical risk assessment runs three scenarios from Q4 2026 through the 2028 window.

Updated 9 Sep 2026 — India was not destabilised in 2026; it was repriced: a strike ladder climbed and contained in November, a border truce without a settlement, the mother of all trade deals concluded in January, and a sanctions trigger armed in Washington. Our managed-competition baseline holds — barely. The updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2028 US election cycle.