All Reports

Libya 2026: Record oil production meets institutional collapse. The Dbeibeh-Haftar duopoly has formalised under US auspices while the Africa Corps expands across Fezzan. Three calibrated scenarios for Q3 2027 with implications for investors, security managers, and migration policy. CES Intelligence geopolitical risk assessment.

The first free election in two decades produced a government. It did not produce the institutions that government needs to succeed. Bangladesh's democratic gamble unfolds amid an Islamist opposition surge, a fractured Indian relationship, China's $9 billion Bay of Bengal embedding, and a banking sector with the world's second-highest NPL ratio. Three scenarios for boards and executive teams.

Georgia's value as the sole overland gateway for the Middle Corridor has never been higher—precisely as its government's alignment with Western interests has never been weaker. With 8,500 Russian troops 25 miles from Tbilisi, EU candidacy frozen, and the Armenian TRIPP corridor threatening to bypass Georgian territory entirely, this CES Intelligence assessment maps three divergent pathways through 2027 for boards exposed to Caspian energy and South Caucasus transit.

CES Intelligence analyzes South Korea's 2026 geopolitical risks: North Korean nuclear maturation, US-China semiconductor tensions, KOSPI volatility, and strategic exposure across defense, technology, and energy sectors.

CES Intelligence assesses Algeria's 2026 geopolitical risk profile: political consolidation without legitimacy, hydrocarbon dependency at 93% of exports, militarised rivalry with Morocco, Sahel frontier deterioration, and a plural alignment strategy approaching its elasticity limit. Three scenarios through 2027 with implications for energy, defence, finance, and logistics sectors.

How a cheap drone that closed the Sea of Azov, a one-way attack UAV that struck a container ship in Hormuz, and 144 unmanned incursions over NATO nuclear sites converge into a single structural shift boards have not mapped.

Europe wants to triple its nuclear capacity by 2035. But the uranium will come from mines it doesn't control, converted in facilities it can't replicate, and enriched by a competitor it's trying to decouple from. The framing error boards are making: treating nuclear fuel as a procurement line item when it is a supply-chain architecture with a binding constraint two layers below.

Most corporate exposure models in the Indo-Pacific are built on a binary premise: Taiwan is either at war or it is not. That premise is wrong. China is altering the status quo by increments — each below the threshold of armed conflict — while security, commercial and diplomatic architectures re-align simultaneously. July 2026 is the month these vectors converge. The boards still waiting for a clear signal to reprice their exposure are already behind the curve.

The Trump-Xi summit produced tactical stabilisation, not a reset. For European institutional decision-makers, the binding capital architecture constraints have tightened — not loosened.

Defense, energy, capital — three architectures, one arithmetic constraint. Why €300 billion in annual savings outflows will determine whether Europe reaches its 2030 sovereignty targets.

The dollar had its worst year in five decades in 2025 — yet its structural dominance just slightly strengthened. Reading the paradox through 2026's Iran war.

The Munich Security Index 2026 ranked cyberattacks the single most serious perceived national security risk across the G7. Eurelectric documented 23 successful cyberattacks against European energy operators in twelve months. Salt Typhoon remains active inside US networks. The European Commission itself was breached on 24 March 2026. This is no longer a discussion about cybersecurity posture—it is a discussion about strategic positioning in a contested theater that runs twenty

The United States has made its choice. Fifteen DIB-related executive orders, the 2026 NDAA, JPMorganChase's $1.5 trillion Security and Resiliency Initiative, and a federal pivot from subsidy to equity stakes form the infrastructure of a rearmament doctrine. Europe now faces the consequence: align with the American industrial acceleration, or build an autonomous alternative fast enough to matter. The third option—incremental hedging—has already expired. A strategic briefing fo

The US now controls 75% of global AI compute, China 15%. That asymmetry is not accidental—it is the product of three competing regulatory regimes, record enforcement penalties, and a structurally fragmented technology. On 19 March 2026, three Super Micro executives were indicted for $2.5 billion in illegal AI server exports. This is the new baseline. An operational analysis of what AI sovereignty means for boards in 2026.

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis has made one thing clear: global trade is no longer a logistics problem but a political one. In this analysis, I step back from the noise to examine why this shift is durable, what the $1.4 trillion capex cycle really signals, and how three plausible scenarios should shape the way companies and investors position themselves through 2030.

2025 was a warning; 2026 is the realization. The global order has not just shifted—it has recalibrated into a permanent state of high-velocity friction. Corporate boards currently operating on legacy globalization software will find their strategies obsolete by Q3. Stability is no longer the baseline; it is a statistical anomaly. Success in this cycle requires the clinical integration of geopolitical volatility into the core profit-and-loss statement. Observe or adapt.