All Reports

Updated 8 Oct 2026 — Iran was not broken in 2026; it was militarised: decapitated in February, metered through autumn, governed by an IRGC that measures victory in survival. Our August de-escalation scenario has degraded; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2030 reconstitution window.

Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council suspended presidential and legislative ballots scheduled for December 2026. With only 769,000 voters registered and the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force at one-third deployment, armed groups now exercise de facto governance over key corridors. This shift carries material implications for Caribbean migration routes, freight insurance, and regional security architecture.

The third quarter of 2026 confirmed what we anticipated in our summer edition: volatility is no longer cyclical, it is structural. One topic now registers EXTREME. Seven register HIGH. None improved. The full synthesis inside.

Updated 5 Oct 2026 — The Horn of Africa was not destabilised in 2026; it fractured: Ethiopia's seven-group coalition reset the war in September, Egypt closed its maritime encirclement, and the AUSSOM mandate expires unfunded on 31 December. Our August coalition-escalation triggers have fired; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for 2027 through the 2028 transition.

The CPC puts a very strong El Niño at over 90% for winter 2026–27, with 75% odds of the strongest index reading on record. This assessment maps what that means in board-level terms: a Peruvian anchoveta quota already cut 36%, the Panama Canal's dry-season floor converging with the closure of Hormuz, three Andean grids rationing on the same drought, and food-led inflation arriving ahead of the meteorological peak. Three dated scenarios through Q2 2027 for organisations sourcin

European gas storage 2026 begins the heating season at its thinnest level in fifteen years. Not a shortage of molecules — a geopolitical premium attached to every one of them. The October–November injection curve decides the price.

As the Kordofan Sudan offensive 2026 cracks Al-Mazroub and opens the road to Darfur, the UN Security Council races its 9 October deadline to vote on a nationwide arms embargo.

Robots made ground cheap around Lyman; Moscow's answer makes cities costly. As Kyiv doubles its refinery campaign, the fifth winter becomes an endurance race between two collapsing infrastructures.

Updated 3 Oct 2026 — Ethiopia was not destabilised in 2026; it fractured: seven armies allied in September, at war by the 23rd, severed from Eritrea and Egypt by the 1st of October. Our August stagnation scenario is dead; the updated assessment runs three scenarios to mid-2027, from federal containment to a regionalised cascade.

Updated 3 Oct 2026 — Taiwan was not invaded in 2026; it was encircled: quarantined from June, tested through September's stalemate summit, and priced by an insurance market that can read a coast guard patrol as accurately as a missile. Our August grey-zone momentum scenario has held; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through Q4 2027.

The November 2026 elections are not a domestic event — they are a geopolitical instrument. CES Intelligence maps how the Iran conflict, Strait of Hormuz oil shocks, and sanctions architecture synchronize with Washington's electoral calendar. Three calibrated scenarios, probabilities, and actionable implications for organisations exposed to energy, defence, and sanctions risk.

Updated 2 Oct 2026 — Europe's energy security was not solved in 2026; it was repriced: anchored in oil above $90, enforced at 632 designated vessels, and rebuilt on Chinese inverters. Our July managed-three-track thesis held — barely; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through 2030.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — Pakistan was not destabilised in 2026; it was leveraged: sworn into the Mecca pact in August, tested by Houthi strikes in September, and held together by a mediation it cannot exit. Our threshold-state framework holds; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through the 2027 fighting season.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — The Mecca Defence Pact 2026 institutionalised in eight weeks, then failed its first test in ninety. Istanbul's committee meets, Riyadh's secretariat staffs, but the Article 5 clause never fired when Houthis burned Jazan again. Our hedging scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three rebased scenarios for Q4 2026–Q3 2027.

Updated Oct 1, 2026 — The Philippines was not attacked in 2026; it was worn down: baton-struck in July, obstructed by navy warships in September, governed by an elite too consumed by impeachment to respond. Our August stress scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through Q2 2027.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — The Ukraine Russia War 2026 did not freeze with the summer's diplomacy: it compounded. The Kremlin's end-of-year deadline for Donetsk is now assessed as missed; a fuel crisis once dismissed as episodic has become the war's decisive asymmetric weapon; and a Duma supermajority has been installed precisely to authorise whatever October requires. Our July forgotten-theatre thesis has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through the Q4 2026 m

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — Venezuela was not rescued in 2026; it was repossessed: decapitated in January, refinanced in August, proceduralised in September. The zombie state now has equity holders, and the talks that were meant to end it have converted the opposition into a signatory. Our July scenario has come true in the details as well as the direction; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2028–2030 transition window.

Updated 30 Sep 2026 — Yemen was not rescued in 2026; it was conquered without conquest: the coast seized, the corridor priced at 3%, the Mecca pact untested. Our August offshore scenario has moved into the air domain; the updated assessment rebases probabilities through Q1 2027.

CES Intelligence's Djibouti 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps a system that sells security to great powers — eight military tenants, $300M annual rent, a succession vacuum at age 78, and a corridor defection risk from Ethiopia. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and actionable implications for maritime, defence, and sovereign-exposure portfolios.

The kingdom was abolished in 2008; the demand for order was not. This Nepal 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps a republic governed by fire, rebuilt by water and financed by departures — with three scenarios and board-level implications.