All Reports

Khartoum has put Ethiopia's name on a week of drone strikes that left its capital and fuel belt dark. Whether the dossier holds is almost secondary — what it buys Khartoum is the question.

On 27 September, 70.15 per cent of Swiss voters rejected strict neutrality. The question is deferred, not settled: sanctions convergence is now the operating condition of Swiss foreign policy. This CES Intelligence assessment maps three scenarios through 2028 — managed erosion, alignment snap, fortress rupture — with dates, triggers and portfolio implications.

Updated 28 Oct 2026 — The Strait of Hormuz was not closed in 2026; it was converted: blacklisted in tranches, tolled by decree, bypassed by shuttle. Our managed-attrition scenario remains the modal path; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through Q2 2027.

Riyadh's answer to the Hormuz war premium is logistical, not military: pre-positioning security stock inside customer territory. Singapore has just become Asia's first purpose-built node for absorbing Gulf risk.

Timor-Leste is not a poor country. It is a prepaid one — running down an $18.6 billion Petroleum Fund at three times the sustainable rate, a year after joining ASEAN and two years after Washington walked away. Canberra is buying its security; Beijing is building its ports. Three clocks — depletion, decision, succession — are now coupled, and none can be dismissed alone.

Vučić conceded on 25 October: the Student List holds an absolute majority — and inherits none of the state. CES Intelligence maps the ninety-day contest between mandate and machine, the 31 December gas deadline, and the EU's reopened door.

Opposition leader María Corina Machado returned to Venezuela on 25 October after ten months in exile — to a transition that has outlasted its own authorisation, US-brokered talks that exclude her, and no scheduled election. Meanwhile, the oil architecture runs on a 50-year clock while the political roadmap is bounded by January 2029. The gap between the two is the Venezuela political transition risk no board can afford to ignore.

A mediation timed to the US midterms, an Egyptian parliament voting for cobelligerence: the region is pricing an American return to strikes, not betting against it.

The corridor is the country. Tanzania's geopolitical value does not reside in its territory — it resides in what crosses it: Gulf-bound container flows, Great Lakes mineral freight, regional electrons, and an Indian Ocean coastline now courted by every maritime power. It is highly likely the corridor will deepen through 2027, but stability is priced while legitimacy is not.

The Guyana–US defense partnership inserts an American military presence into the Essequibo dispute before the International Court of Justice rules — an insurance policy whose value survives whichever way The Hague decides.

Athens is not a crisis state — it is a constrained one. This Greece geopolitical risk assessment maps the post-RRF fiscal cliff, the 3.65 per cent defence burden, migration pressure concentrated on Crete, and the coupled energy-tourism-shipping exposure that decides whether investment grade holds. Three probability-weighted scenarios for boards with Hellenic exposure, horizon 18–24 months.

Egypt, Ethiopia and the hydropower trap: with the GERD complete, the Nile dispute has moved from construction to flow control. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and operational implications for organisations exposed to East African power, Egyptian sovereign debt and Red Sea logistics.

Sovereignty in Laos is not eroding — it is being liquidated asset by asset. This assessment maps how Chinese debt deferrals, a 25-year grid concession, the Ban Keun airbase and the Mekong dam cascade converted a state's core functions into a schedule of collateral, and what that means for board-level exposure.

Updated 22 Oct 2026 — The South China Sea was not stabilised by diplomacy in 2026; it was placed under administration: 101 vessels around contested features, a warship-escorted resupply blockade, and deliveries now "permitted" under Beijing's monitoring. Our post-summit attrition scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios from the Shenzhen summit through Q1 2027.

Norway supplies 30% of Europe's gas from 8,800 km of subsea pipeline — the continent's single largest coercion target. This assessment maps the Svalbard treaty erosion, the GUGI cable campaign, the 2029–2032 rearmament gap, and three probability-weighted scenarios for boards with Nordic exposure.

The breakaway Sahel states are negotiating the terms of their regional reinsertion at the precise moment their one credible asset — a monopoly on security — is being repriced downward by the war their exit was supposed to end. The Oudalan battle sets the asking price; Moscow collects it.

Six days separate Trump's "massive" Greenland exploration pledge from the EU's renewed Arctic drilling ban. Two allied doctrines now claim the same subsurface — and only one controls the market that would price the other's claim.

Washington's export controls didn't close the frontier of compute — they repriced it. Three Chinese tech giants just placed a $35 billion order for the workstation chip the rules never covered. Our Signal on the corridor Beijing bought in bulk, the supply math that caps it, and the 1.8 GW invoice attached.

Eight hundred thirty megawatts against 2,820 of demand on 19 October. As ETECSA's payment rails fail in rhythm with the grid, Havana is losing the administrative surface through which it governs — and Washington is negotiating with the state it is starving.

With military channels suspended as Chinese presence around Philippine outposts nearly doubles, the hazard in the South China Sea is no longer the collision — it is the vacuum around it.