All Reports

Updated Oct 1, 2026 — The Philippines was not attacked in 2026; it was worn down: baton-struck in July, obstructed by navy warships in September, governed by an elite too consumed by impeachment to respond. Our August stress scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through Q2 2027.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — The Ukraine Russia War 2026 did not freeze with the summer's diplomacy: it compounded. The Kremlin's end-of-year deadline for Donetsk is now assessed as missed; a fuel crisis once dismissed as episodic has become the war's decisive asymmetric weapon; and a Duma supermajority has been installed precisely to authorise whatever October requires. Our July forgotten-theatre thesis has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through the Q4 2026 m

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — Venezuela was not rescued in 2026; it was repossessed: decapitated in January, refinanced in August, proceduralised in September. The zombie state now has equity holders, and the talks that were meant to end it have converted the opposition into a signatory. Our July scenario has come true in the details as well as the direction; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2028–2030 transition window.

Updated 30 Sep 2026 — Yemen was not rescued in 2026; it was conquered without conquest: the coast seized, the corridor priced at 3%, the Mecca pact untested. Our August offshore scenario has moved into the air domain; the updated assessment rebases probabilities through Q1 2027.

Updated 30 Sep 2026 — The Bab el-Mandeb blockade did not close the strait; it nationalised it: Mocha and Perim seized in an 18-hour September blitz, war-risk premiums re-rated to 3–10 percent of hull value, the Saudi East-West pipeline repaired to half its surge capacity. Our July taxation-regime scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the H1 2027 planning horizon.

Updated 29 Sep 2026 — China was not stabilized in 2026; it was deferred: truce extended by sixty days, its two most senior generals expelled from the Party in September, and a Party Congress calendar that compresses every risk vector into one window. Our three scenarios have been recalibrated; the updated China 2026 geopolitical risk assessment runs the corridor from the January 10 truce expiry to the 2027 Party Congress.

CES Intelligence's Djibouti 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps a system that sells security to great powers — eight military tenants, $300M annual rent, a succession vacuum at age 78, and a corridor defection risk from Ethiopia. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and actionable implications for maritime, defence, and sovereign-exposure portfolios.

The kingdom was abolished in 2008; the demand for order was not. This Nepal 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps a republic governed by fire, rebuilt by water and financed by departures — with three scenarios and board-level implications.

Cambodia has not surrendered its sovereignty to China — it has converted it into a subscription service. This Cambodia 2026 Geopolitical Risk Assessment maps the pricing: PLAN corvettes at a Chinese-built pier, a $1 billion Exim loan sealing the Funan Techo canal, elections pre-decided by lawfare, and a scam crackdown selective enough to reprice the country without touching its sponsors. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and the four bellwethers boards should watch b

First oil is a political event before it is fiscal. The landlocked republic's EACOP corridor, dual executive, and ADF flank converge in October 2026.

Kigali enters late 2026 with its military under US sanctions, its flagship refinery designated, aid relationships severed — yet posting 9.38% growth, tourism up 6%, banking profits at record highs. This CES Intelligence report maps a state that has industrialised the space between sanction and access.

Updated September 22, 2026 — The $40 billion backstop no longer exists as advertised: a Treasury swap stands, a bank facility was shelved, a repo replaces the rest. Milei's fiscal surplus meets 2027's debt wall. Our July assessment has matured: three scenarios run through the 2027 election while Brazil institutionalises the rupture, the Falklands lever moves to statute, and corruption dockets acquire forensic texture.

Updated: Sep 22, 2026 Thailand 2026: The state where geopolitical theatres converge most productively and most precariously. The Iran war transmits through energy imports the kingdom cannot reform; China's infrastructure ambitions have converted its geography into an asset priced in alignment; Myanmar's collapse has installed a criminal economy on its western border; the American alliance has hollowed into a quarterly transaction; upstream hydraulics hold its agricultural hea

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — Turkey was not rewarded in 2026; it was rented out: the Hormuz closure reactivated Kirkuk-Ceyhan (then capped it at 750 kb/d by interim accord on 1 August), CAATSA relief was announced but remains hostage to Congress, and the opposition fractured precisely when it consolidated. Our rent-extraction baseline held; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through 2027 with the lira as the leading indicator of whether the premium survives its own foundati

Sweden and Finland's NATO accession did not end Nordic security — it inverted it. This 2026 assessment maps the Northern Front: shadow fleets, cable sabotage, Gotland, defence budgets, and the American variable no ally controls.

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — Lithuania was not reassured in 2026; it was repositioned: the US rotation gap opened in June, the first drone shootdown occurred in September, and five percent of GDP now finances a deficit with no expiry date. The July hybrid-deterrence scenario has crystallised; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2027 posture review.

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — The DRC was not stabilised in 2026; it was auctioned: partitioned in the east, indebted to Washington, mortgaged to Moscow, and governed by a leader rewriting the constitution he swore to uphold. Our July fragmentation scenario is now the baseline; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for the Q2 2027 window — referendum, withdrawal, and the fastest-growing Ebola outbreak on record.

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — Sudan was not divided by the war; it was reorganised by it: partitioned in practice since 2025, drone-contested since September, and now the endpoint of a Hormuz-bypass energy map it cannot defend. Our army-momentum inversion is underway; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through mid-2027.

Updated September 21, 2026 — The southern flank of NATO was not assumed in 2026; it was tested. Rota-Morón access denied, Ceuta breached at scale, PP-Vox transition now probable, Russian LNG window closing by January 2027. Our July analysis flagged three scenarios; the updated Spain 2026 geopolitical risk assessment recalibrates probabilities through November 6 and maps implications for defence, automotive, energy and insurance exposure across the Iberian footprint.

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — Iraq was not stabilised in 2026; it was decompressed: the militia disarmament deadline dissolved in August, oil recovered into a re-closed Hormuz, and the state now pays salaries late. Our managed-fragmentation baseline has become the living trajectory; the updated assessment runs three scenarios from the September US withdrawal through the 2028 political cycle.