Sudan 2026: The Partitioned State and the Forgotten Theatre
- Thierry Marquez
- 3 days ago
- 12 min read
Updated: 2 days ago
Contents
This CES Intelligence strategic assessment provides a comprehensive Sudan 2026 geopolitical risk assessment that maps the theatre where Emirati proxy ambition, Russian resource extraction, and Gulf-Saudi rivalry converge on a collapsed African state.
Key Takeaways
De facto partition is now irreversible. Sudan operates as two parallel territories with separate governments and revenue systems; SAF holds the east including Khartoum and the Red Sea coast while RSF dominates the west including Darfur mining zones.
US intelligence has documented UAE arms deliveries to RSF through Chad. Abu Dhabi received upgraded export status in July 2026 despite confirmed weapons transfers — Washington prioritizes Iran cooperation over Sudan stabilisation.
Gold finances the conflict without Moscow budgetary support. Russia's Africa Corps holds stakes in Meroe Gold and M-Invest; RSF controls mining operations across Darfur with proceeds flowing through Emirati shell companies.
World's largest displacement crisis continues unchecked. UNHCR data confirms 12 million displaced, 4.5 million refugees, 33.7 million requiring aid; Egypt hosts 1.4 million while Chad absorbed over one million in two years.
El Fasher's October 2025 fall triggered genocide findings. Amnesty International documented crimes against humanity targeting children and Zaghawa communities; over 1,300 civilians killed in the first week alone.
Sanctions remain structurally ineffective. US targeted SAF over chemical weapons allegations while EU and UK pursued RSF gold revenue — contradictory signals enable regulatory arbitrage while the UAE operates without consequence.
Red Sea coastline gains strategic value amid Hormuz diversification. Seven pipeline projects aim to reroute Gulf oil; Sudan's 853-kilometre access becomes a contested asset where UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Russia compete for influence.
Jeddah mediation process is functionally dead. The Quartet remains internally divided with mediators serving as combatants' patrons; African Arguments (21 July 2026) describes the situation as "negotiating a war that no longer exists."
American strategic capacity is the critical constraint. Washington manages simultaneous theatres across Iran, South China Sea, Venezuela, Cuba, and Sudan — bandwidth deficits enable impunity zones and embolden adversarial exploitation.
Sudan 2026 Geopolitical Risk: Three Converging Pressures
1. The Partition Imperative
SAF recapture of Khartoum in mid-2025 combined with RSF seizure of El Fasher in October 2025 crystallised a territorial division that cannot be undone by negotiation. The UK government's July 2026 country policy note observes that the conflict "increasingly took on the characteristics of a war of attrition" with ground control broadly divided between the two forces. Fighting has affected all 18 states, though intensity varies. RSF dominance extends across western Sudan including Darfur, nearly the whole of West Kordofan, key positions in North and South Kordofan, and territory along Libyan and Egyptian borders. SAF controls most of northern, eastern and central Sudan, including River Nile, Northern, Kassala, Gedaref, Red Sea, Khartoum and Al Jazirah. Blue Nile remains contested.
Africa Center for Strategic Studies noted in July 2026 that both parties "operate as shifting coalitions of armed groups rather than unified organisational structures," complicating any post-conflict settlement because negotiators do not fully control fighters on the ground. This fragmentation has "reshaped the political landscape as armed groups leveraged their security role to expand political influence."
2. The Proxy Ecosystem
External support and hunger for gold prolong Sudan's violent power struggle. Regional supply routes enable weapons flows through neighbouring states. The April 2023 ignition began as an internal junta power struggle between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (SAF) and General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo/Hemedti (RSF).
Though UAE officials deny aiding the RSF, evidence collected by international organisations — the United Nations among them — points to Abu Dhabi utilising humanitarian covers at airfields and hospitals in Chad to facilitate cargo flights transporting drones and military equipment. Emirati ties to the RSF date back to the Yemeni civil war in 2018, including cooperation with Wagner for arms deliveries and logistics financing from within the Emirates. Identity documents recovered from a 2024 plane crash included a Russian passport and an ID linking to a UAE-based company.
Wagner rebranded as Africa Corps participates in the mineral-for-weapons trade through ownership stakes in Sudanese companies Meroe Gold and M-Invest. Gun-gold flows between Wagner and the RSF have strengthened Russian regional influence. Emirati arms enable RSF mining control, with proceeds cycling back through UAE channels to purchase additional weaponry.
3. The Capacity Deficit
Washington now manages simultaneous commitments across multiple theatres: the Iran war in the Gulf (active since February 2026), grey-zone confrontation with China in the South China Sea, governance of Venezuela's zombie state, construction of a Cuba intervention pretext, and enforcement of the Trump administration's revived Monroe Doctrine framework—what CES Intelligence has termed the "Donroe Doctrine"—calibrated for great-power competition.
Strategic capacity remains the critical driver across the CES Intelligence framework. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee acknowledged this explicitly: "Because of other relationships we have with the UAE, we have seen time and time again that using U.S. arms sales as a way to manipulate a country really does not work." With UAE support for Washington's Iran war, the Trump administration upgraded Abu Dhabi's export status in July 2026, granting broader access to US technologies and weaponry.
Ending the conflict has bipartisan support, but targeting the UAE "has been a no-go for both the White House and broadly Republicans on the Hill." This represents a calculated trade-off, not negligence. Washington accepts Sudan's destabilisation as collateral damage for Emirati cooperation in the Middle East.
The Geography of Division: Two Sudans, No Reconciliation Mechanism
Following the RSF capture of El Fasher in October 2025—the last SAF stronghold in Darfur—territorial division hardened into something resembling a border. The Sudanese Armed Forces under General al-Burhan control eastern and central states: Khartoum (recaptured mid-2025), River Nile, Northern, Kassala, Gedaref, Red Sea, and Al Jazirah. The government, led by Prime Minister Kamil Idris appointed by Burhan in May 2025, relocated from wartime exile in Port Sudan back to Khartoum—a symbolic assertion of authority extending no further.
The Rapid Support Forces under Hemedti dominate the western half: entire Darfur, most West Kordofan, key North and South Kordofan positions, and territory along Libyan and Egyptian borders. The RSF established a parallel government headquartered in Nyala, South Darfur. Both claim civilian administrations. Both are power-sharing arrangements among armed groups. Neither exercises the monopoly on force defining a functioning state.
Active combat shifted to Kordofan and Blue Nile, where drone warfare dominates. The UK government's July 2026 policy note confirms the conflict "increasingly took on the characteristics of a war of attrition." RSF conducts drone strikes against SAF-controlled areas—Khartoum and Omdurman included—from Nyala headquarters. SAF relocated aircraft to Eritrea to preserve air assets.
UNHCR Operational Data Portal records as of April 2026 show nearly twelve million people forcibly displaced. Over 6.8 million remain internally displaced within Sudan; close to 4.5 million are refugees, asylum seekers, and returnees. The IRC puts the figure above fourteen million. Egypt currently hosts 1.4 million Sudanese refugees—registrations nearly quadrupled since 2023. Chad absorbed over one million, exceeding the previous two decades' total. Thirty-three point seven million people—over half the population—require humanitarian assistance.
Human rights organisations and UN officials continue decrying the situation. A February 2026 UN fact-finding mission found RSF actions showed "hallmarks of genocide." The Council on Foreign Relations reports experts say ongoing violence and the lack of viable solutions further raise partition risks.
The Self-Financing War Economy: Gold, Drones, and the Emirati Pipeline
The structural mechanism sustaining this war mirrors our Sahel documentation: a self-financing loop where mineral extraction funds armed groups, and armed groups protect mineral extraction. Sudan ranks among Africa's top three gold producers. Hemedti's RSF controls mining operations across Darfur and Kordofan. Proceeds launder through Emirati-linked shell companies for weapons purchases, salaries, media campaigns, and factional loyalty acquisition.
UAE involvement moves beyond suspicion into documentation. Multiple US intelligence assessments confirmed Abu Dhabi supplied the RSF with drones, armoured vehicles, and ammunition—routed through covert cargo flights using humanitarian covers at Chad airfields and hospitals. The UN Permanent Representative for Sudan formally accused the UAE of violating the arms embargo in March 2024. Amnesty International corroborated. The UAE denies everything.
Resilience stems from asymmetric consequences. US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch acknowledged the problem: "Because of other relationships we have with the UAE, we have seen time and time again that using U.S. arms sales as a way to manipulate a country really does not work — because Russia and China, others are there to sell them weapons." Conflict termination enjoys bipartisan support, yet targeting the UAE remains impossible. Transactional necessity drives the calculation: Washington needs Abu Dhabi's Iran war cooperation. July 2026 export status upgrades granted broader US technology access—rewarding the very state arming the RSF.
This pattern echoes our Venezuela and South China Sea assessments: strategic overstretch creates impunity zones. The UAE calculates—with justification—that Iran theatre indispensability insulates Sudan operations from American pressure. Result: a proxy war conducted with near-total immunity.
Russia's Africa Corps operates a parallel layer. Through stakes in Meroe Gold and M-Invest, Africa Corps secures influence requiring no Moscow budgetary allocation. Paramilitaries provide security to resource-holding armed groups in exchange for mineral concessions—a template echoing Sahel operations. Revenues flow outward; weapons move inward. Host states lack capacity to monitor, tax, or regulate either layer. Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air documentation shows Russia's shadow fleet, increasingly registered under African flags, transports roughly half its seaborne oil—approximately $100 billion annually. Sudanese gold feeds the same shadow economy.
The Sanctions Gap: Three Jurisdictions, No Coherent Framework
July 2026 saw intensified sanctions response paired with structural incoherence. The United States imposed new measures over chemical weapons allegations during the civil war—targeting the SAF-aligned government, not the RSF. Sudan rejected sanctions as politically motivated, insisting adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The European Union pursued a different path, sanctioning Sudan's gold trade on 13 July 2026—directly aimed at RSF financing mechanisms. The United Kingdom followed on 16 July with measures targeting eleven institutions including an RSF financier, procurement operatives, Hong Kong and UAE-based companies, and three Sudanese state-owned mining enterprises.
Multiple failure vectors emerge. Uncoordinated priorities define the first: US chemical weapons measures target the SAF government while EU gold restrictions pursue RSF financing—a contradictory signal permitting both parties to claim victimhood under politicised enforcement. Routing complexity constitutes the second flaw: gold flows through UAE intermediaries, a jurisdiction simultaneously a sanctions designee (indirectly via named companies) and US strategic partner. Regulatory arbitrage undermines enforcement itself—formal banking structures bear the sanctions burden while the RSF operates entirely outside regulated systems.
The Red Sea Prize: Sudan's Coastline and the New Energy Geography
Sudan's 853-kilometre Red Sea coastline stretches from Egyptian to Eritrean borders, providing direct maritime access from the Gulf to the Sahel and sub-Saharan interior. As the US-Iran war disrupts Hormuz, Gulf states accelerate at least seven major pipeline projects designed to reroute oil exports via the Red Sea. Goldman Sachs estimates up to 60% of Gulf oil exports could bypass Hormuz by 2028 using these routes. This places Africa's Red Sea coastline—touching Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti—at the centre of a redrawn global energy map.
Abu Dhabi understands the stakes. Interest transcends opportunism—it is structural. The Horn Review reports that "by having control over Sudan, they position themselves in a much stronger spot to compete with Saudi Arabia." The Emirates' Sudan push serves defensive purposes: creating dependency networks along Africa's coast to counterbalance Saudi megaprojects like Neom on the opposite shore. A cancelled $6 billion Emirati port deal reflects both stakes and volatility.
Saudi Arabia backs the SAF through the Jeddah process to preserve influence. Riyadh and Cairo view Sudan's Red Sea coast through a security prism: state failure disrupts Saudi projects and threatens Egyptian strategic depth. Egypt absorbed 1.4 million refugees facing structural migration pressure that will intensify with deterioration.
Moscow has sought a Red Sea naval base—a long-standing ambition predating the current war. The Wall Street Journal reported Sudan offered Russia its first African naval base with mining concessions. Whether Port Sudan's SAF administration honours the commitment depends on survival prospects, Russian arms dependency, and whether Moscow's RSF alignment through Africa Corps creates unmanageable conflicts of interest.
The Jeddah Illusion: Negotiating a War That No Longer Exists
The Jeddah mediation process—nominally led by the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt—is functionally defunct. The Quartet remains internally divided over RSF handling, with the track described by African Arguments (21 July 2026) as "negotiating a war that no longer exists." May 2023 declarations remain unimplemented. Successive ceasefires collapsed. The Berlin Conference failed. Prime Minister Idris's December 2025 peace plan went nowhere after European rejection. Oman attempted alternative mediation. Saudi Arabia enlisted South Sudan to leverage ties with Hemedti. None altered the trajectory.
Eighteen months after Quartet establishment, member disagreements paved the way for restructuring. Egypt and the US Special Adviser on Africa met in Antalya in April 2026. The framework is effectively restructuring due to internal divisions.
Failure stems from straightforward pathology: mediators serve as combatants' patrons. The UAE arms the RSF while seated at the mediation table. Saudi Arabia and Egypt back the SAF. Washington cannot pressure Abu Dhabi without jeopardising Iran cooperation. The framework aims to resolve a bilateral power struggle between Burhan and Hemedti. The war is no longer bilateral—it is a multi-actor proxy conflict with self-financing economies, parallel governments, and territorial division that neither side has incentive or capacity to reverse.
Scenario Analysis: Four Pathways Through Q1 2027
Scenario A — Managed Stalemate and Consolidated Partition (probability: ~50–55%). Attrition continues at reduced intensity. De facto partition solidifies into quasi-permanent east-west divide. SAF consolidates institutional governance in Khartoum with limited recognition. RSF establishes administrative structures in Darfur and Kordofan, leveraging gold revenues and Emirati support. Sanctions impose friction costs without altering fundamental revenue systems. Humanitarian emergency stabilises at chronic baseline levels while receiving diminishing attention as the Iran war absorbs resources. Migration sustains at current volumes. Red Sea coastline remains under SAF control, preserving maritime stability, though development potential faces institutional constraints.
Scenario B — RSF Territorial Expansion and Collapse Acceleration (probability: ~25–30%). RSF breakthroughs in Kordofan advance toward the central corridor or Red Sea states. Drone superiority delivers decisive tactical advantage. SAF morale and command cohesion degrade as war economies fail. Internal fractures—Darfuri Joint Forces defections, Nile Valley elite confidence loss—accelerate institutional breakdown. Port Sudan comes under threat. Migration surges: Egypt and Chad reach capacity; secondary movement toward Libya and the Mediterranean intensifies. Coastal status becomes contested, introducing maritime dimensions drawing direct Saudi, Egyptian, and potentially external naval involvement. Gold revenues surge as RSF consolidates mining control. The self-financing system achieves escape velocity. Our assessment elevates this probability due to drone warfare advantages, stalled SAF momentum, and ineffective sanctions.
Scenario C — Exhaustion and External Imposition (probability: ~15–20%). Both parties reach material exhaustion simultaneously. Coordinated EU-UK sanctions sufficiently degrade RSF gold revenues that Hemedti cannot sustain force levels. SAF isolation—chemical weapons measures, economic collapse, lost Gulf confidence—forces Burhan into otherwise unacceptable power-sharing. External actors impose settlement frameworks backed by credible incentives: Gulf financial packages conditional on compliance, enhanced spoiler sanctions, security guarantees. This scenario remains least probable given independent improbability of simultaneous exhaustion and bandwidth restoration—conditions structurally opposed to each other.
Scenario D — Black Swan: Regional War Escalation (probability: ~5–10%). Red Sea dimensions trigger interstate conflict. Houthi attacks on Saudi tankers expand to Sudanese territorial waters. Eritrea enters on the SAF side. Saudi Arabia launches direct strikes on RSF Darfur positions. Egypt deploys expeditionary forces. Russia activates naval ambitions. At least three regional states and two external powers engage. Oil prices spike above $120/bbl as shipping routes compromise. This overlaps with our Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz assessments—if the Red Sea closes, Sudan's coastal assets become strategic objectives. Catalyst: intersection of Houthi escalation with RSF coastal control.
Implications
For organisations with Red Sea shipping exposure, East African supply chain dependencies, or gold and mineral commodity positions, the Sudan crisis transmits risk through multiple channels. Understanding this framework is essential for boards operating across Red Sea shipping lanes, East African supply chains, or gold commodity markets.
Maritime security. Sudan's Red Sea coastline remains under SAF control with relative stability. Scenario B conditions change this calculation. Port Sudan corridor contestation introduces maritime security risk into an already stressed environment where Houthi attacks and Bab al-Mandeb blockades pose active threats. Operators must model compounding disruptions—Houthi, Sudanese, potentially Eritrean—on insurance premiums, routing, and delivery timelines.
Commodity markets. EU and UK gold sanctions target flows feeding global markets through Emirati and Hong Kong intermediaries. Gold-exposed organisations—jewellery, electronics, investment bullion—should audit supply chains for Sudanese-origin gold laundering through UAE refineries. Enforcement tightening is inevitable as capitals coordinate, yet shadow economy opacity demands enhanced due diligence beyond standard KYC protocols. Africa Corps involvement introduces secondary sanctions exposure for entities in jurisdictions where Russian mineral sanctions apply.
Migration and political stability. The 4.5 million refugees hosted by Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan create host-state pressure. Scenario B triggers migration acceleration toward Libya and the Mediterranean, transforming into a European security concern. Boards in North African markets—particularly Egypt, Libya, Tunisia—must model political and economic consequences of migration-driven instability, including border closures, populist mobilisation, and security-sector strain.
Energy infrastructure. Sudan's Red Sea positioning intersects with Gulf Hormuz diversification strategies. Coastal instability compromises alternative routing architectures. Energy traders and infrastructure operators should treat Sudanese terminals as critical nodes whose disruption compounds existing Middle East shocks. The Iran war, Bab al-Mandeb closure, and coastal instability intersect as correlated risks requiring integrated modelling—not independent variables.
Regulatory exposure. Fragmented enforcement creates ambiguity. Sudan-trade entities navigate conflicting jurisdictions: US chemical weapons measures (SAF-targeted), EU gold restrictions (RSF-targeted), UK mining sanctions (mixed). The UAE remains protected despite serving as the RSF financial conduit. Organisations should assume enforcement tightening and increased retroactive liability as Western capitals seek architectural credibility restoration. Compliance standards must exceed minimum regulatory requirements.
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Thierry Marquez Founder & Principal Advisor, CES Intelligence
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DISCLAIMER
This analysis is provided for informational and strategic planning purposes only. It is not investment advice, financial advice, or legal advice, and it should not be treated as such. Probability assessments reflect the analyst's calibrated judgment based on available open-source intelligence as of the date of publication and are subject to revision as new information emerges. Some quantitative estimates and reported events are based on regional sourcing that may evolve as additional confirmation becomes available.