All Reports

Restructured, not resolved: how Colombo's $38.6bn debt settlement, Beijing's refinery and Delhi's energy arteries converge on the March 2027 programme cliff — with three scenarios for boards to price.

Sovereignty in the atoll republic is now denominated in foreign exchange. This Maldives 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps the sukuk settlement, the defended peg, the Ankara corridor and the surveillance chessboard — with three board-ready scenarios.

El Salvador 2026 is not a safe country. It is a country where violence has been administratively suspended — and the bill arrives in 2027. Full risk assessment.

Namibia has become the quiet coast of the Atlantic: the world's third-largest uranium producer on the one shoreline no great power dominates, sitting on 3.5–3.8 billion undeveloped barrels while Washington, Beijing and Tokyo bid for the same molecules. This 2026 risk assessment maps the Venus FID countdown, SWAPO's centralisation reflex, the Fishrot stress test, and the corridor race against Lobito — with three scenarios and board-level implications for the twelve months ahea

A tier-one resource province wrapped around a tier-three administrative state: Porgera, Papua LNG, Wafi-Golpu and Panguna against clan-held tenure, Highland wars and the China–US auction for the Pacific. Three scenarios to 2027, with a ratification clock ticking toward 2030.

Between Moscow and Beijing, Mongolia's mineral wedge: copper replacing coal, fuel as a coercive instrument, and a selectorate that rotates premiers without renewing power.

The February 2026 Iran war was the first live audit of the Emirati model: a 90% collapse in Jebel Ali throughput, licence-free US AI chips granted weeks later, and secondary sanctions closing in on the Gulf entrepôt. This UAE geopolitical risk assessment maps the couplings — chokepoints, chips, water and demography — and prices three scenarios for 2027.

Political stability is being monetised while the debt becomes the eurozone's largest. This Italy 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps the Mediterranean pivot's fault lines: Qatari LNG under force majeure, the PNRR post-grant cliff, 350,000 SMEs facing the ETS2 cliff, and a 2027 calendar where energy, election and fiscal file converge. Three scenarios, quantified exposure baselines, and board-level implications.

The ceasefire ended the Houthi campaign in November 2025 — yet Bab al-Mandeb transits still run at half their pre-crisis level. Why hasn't traffic returned? This Suez Canal 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps the recovery as it actually is: tanker-led and war-shaped, constrained by charterparty inertia, insurance ratchets and a record orderbook that makes carrier patience profitable. Three scenarios to 2027.

Four FPSOs, 900,000 barrels a day, and a verdict from The Hague due between November 2026 and January 2027. The ICJ ruling will either settle the Essequibo question or weaponise it — this report maps the three trajectories, the war-risk repricing mechanism, and what boards must sequence before Q4.

Updated 15 Sep 2026 — Japan was not protected in 2026; it was besieged: rare earths zeroed since November, LNG secured by a waiver with an expiry date, deterrence priced against a ¥135.8 trillion refinancing schedule. Our July attrition baseline holds; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for the December security rewrite and the 2027 constitutional cycle.

Updated 15 Sep 2026 — Nicaragua was not defeated by sanctions in 2026; it was foreclosed: elections abolished in July, a Russian military pact ratified with jurisdictional immunity in May, a Chinese port hub operational on the Pacific. The fortress holds while American bandwidth is spent elsewhere; this updated assessment runs three scenarios through the 2028 hardening window.

The Bahamas and Jamaica are not peripheral tax havens — they are functioning contamination vectors. This CES Intelligence assessment reveals how drug-corruption corridors plug directly into the US correspondent banking system, with three scenarios through Q3 2027.

Updated 14 Sep 2026 — The Arctic was not opened in 2026; it was repossessed: 42 Russian icebreakers against two American hulls, $6.82 billion in EU LNG payments funding Moscow's war machine, and an alliance fractured by Washington's own Greenland claim. Our July sustained-dominance scenario is materialising on schedule; the updated geopolitical risk assessment runs three scenarios from the January 2027 embargo to the 2028 icebreaker gap.

Updated 13 Sep 2026 — The 26 June Trilateral Framework survived its own expiry but failed to resolve what it postponed. Disarmament and ceasefire have been decoupled; the economy contracted 6.4% after a 4.2% recovery in 2025; UNIFIL's mandate expires on 31 December. Our July assessment has been updated with three pathways for Q4 2026 through the 2028 transition: containment drift, escalation spiral, and intra-state fracture.

Updated 14 Sep 2026 — Brazil was not holding an election in 2026; it was collecting rent on great-power competition: tariffs locked in July, China negotiations accelerated in August, and a Supreme Court probe opened three weeks before the vote. Our July baseline has recalibrated to a statistical tie; the update runs three scenarios through the 2027 transition.

Updated 14 Sep 2026 — Cuba was not defeated in 2026; it was switched off: the grid at cold-start threshold, the negotiation track dead since 7 September, and the oil lifelines contractually sealed by the US–Venezuela deal. Our July sustained-pressure baseline still holds; the updated assessment runs three scenarios from the 24 September Trump–Xi summit through mid-2027.

Updated 14 Sep 2026 — The canal was not blocked in 2026; it was narrowed: capped in September, coerced through its registry, litigated for $3.5 billion. Our July transit-reduction call has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through Q1 2027.

Eighty ships boarded in the Singapore Strait in 2025 — the worst year since 1991. Beneath the world's busiest chokepoint, a corridor where sanctioned oil, criminal syndicates, and submarine survey grids share the same two shipping lanes. The Malacca Strait's risk architecture, stress-tested.

Chad 2026 is not a weak state; it is an over-subscribed one. This Chad 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps a garrison state where jihadist administrations out-tax governments, an Emirati air bridge feeds Sudan's war, and national solvency hangs from a single pipeline. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and implications for logistics, energy and compliance exposure across the Lake Chad Basin.