All Reports

China's rare earth export controls expire on 10 November 2026. Copper is above $13,000 a tonne. Indonesia and the DRC are turning quotas into leverage. Our Critical Minerals 2026 assessment maps the three scenarios, their triggers, and what boards must do before the gates close.

Fiscal buffers exhausted. Battlefield losses crossing the recruitment threshold. A deficit already double its plan by April. Russia 2026 is not collapsing — it is oscillating. Three scenarios, explicit triggers, and what each transmits to executive exposure.

Angola 2026 is not an oil state in crisis. It is an oil state in arithmetic. Production has slipped below one million barrels per day, the ruling party must name a successor it cannot choose, and the street has already vetoed one reform. Three scenarios, explicit triggers and board-level implications — the full assessment.

Zambia has restructured its debt, won an election, and pledged to triple copper output by 2031. But every stabilization gain routes through a single commodity, pulled from the ground by a power system that depends on rain, exported through corridors that two rival powers are building in opposite directions. The wager is that the copper arrives before the water runs out.

With the last US carrier withdrawn from the Western Pacific and China's 12,000-ton coast guard cutter holding station 50 nautical miles off Sarawak, the Strait of Malacca — through which a quarter of global trade flows — is becoming the Indo-Pacific's most consequential pressure point. This Malaysia 2026 geopolitical risk assessment maps the chokepoint cascade, semiconductor bifurcation, rare earth competition, and the fiscal contraction constraining sovereignty assertion.

China has eclipsed Russia as Central Asia's dominant economic partner. The U.S. is pushing for critical minerals. ISIS-K is intensifying. Three scenarios, calibrated probabilities, and sector-specific implications for executives.

Eight opposition parties unite against Ruto. The IMF remains absent over undisclosed debt. China converts Kenyan loans into yuan. Al-Shabaab demonstrates that preventive strikes provoke retaliation. Ten months after Raila Odinga's death, Kenya approaches 2027 without a mediating figure — and on a fiscal cliff edge.

Keiko Fujimori assumed office on 28 July 2026 as Peru's ninth president in a decade. Her inheritance: a copper supercycle that fills the treasury, a Chinese megaport that erodes sovereign oversight, the worst security crisis in living memory, and an authoritarian legacy that inflames every solution it proposes. CES Intelligence assesses three scenarios through 2027.

The world's largest copper producer enters its most volatile period since the return to democracy. José Antonio Kast's emergency government collides with Codelco's structural decline, a water-permitting trap, Indigenous territorial conflict, and intensifying US-China competition over the lithium-copper triangle — while Argentina's RIGI regime diverts the investment Santiago repels.

Azerbaijan has become the indispensable transit state connecting Caspian energy to Europe — but every increment of strategic value multiplies the incentive for adversaries to disrupt it. Following Iran's March 2026 drone strike on Nakhchivan, this assessment examines the Exposure Multiplier dynamic, the TRIPP corridor gamble, the Israel oil-for-arms nexus, and the petro-state inversion as declining output forces a race between transit revenue and hydrocarbon depletion.

Kazakhstan's multi-alignment strategy faces simultaneous pressure from CPC pipeline dependency, Chinese extractive dominance, US secondary sanctions, and Russia's Taliban security partnership.

Georgia's value as the sole overland gateway for the Middle Corridor has never been higher—precisely as its government's alignment with Western interests has never been weaker. With 8,500 Russian troops 25 miles from Tbilisi, EU candidacy frozen, and the Armenian TRIPP corridor threatening to bypass Georgian territory entirely, this CES Intelligence assessment maps three divergent pathways through 2027 for boards exposed to Caspian energy and South Caucasus transit.

CES Intelligence analyzes South Korea's 2026 geopolitical risks: North Korean nuclear maturation, US-China semiconductor tensions, KOSPI volatility, and strategic exposure across defense, technology, and energy sectors.

CES Intelligence assesses Algeria's 2026 geopolitical risk profile: political consolidation without legitimacy, hydrocarbon dependency at 93% of exports, militarised rivalry with Morocco, Sahel frontier deterioration, and a plural alignment strategy approaching its elasticity limit. Three scenarios through 2027 with implications for energy, defence, finance, and logistics sectors.

Morocco 2026: Western Sahara sovereignty, Chinese industrial capture, migration weaponisation, and water crisis converge to define Rabat's strategic hedge between Washington, Beijing, and Europe.

New CES Intelligence briefing reveals the lithography supply chain beneath every advanced fab is narrower than the foundry layer boards are monitoring. With ASML producing 50-60 EUV machines annually and Zeiss as sole optics provider, equipment availability—not capital—is the binding constraint on global semiconductor sovereignty through 2028.

China's mBridge settled $55.5 billion at 95% in digital yuan after the BIS walked away. 127 banks exited emerging-market correspondent relationships. Iran collected Hormuz tolls in Bitcoin. The clearing architecture beneath every cross-border transaction is splitting along geopolitical lines — and boards are still pricing it as a currency exposure.

Approximately $10 trillion in daily financial transactions flow through undersea fiber-optic cables. They are being deliberately severed — by shadow fleets operating below the threshold of armed conflict, exploiting legal gaps boards haven't mapped. The framing error: treating undersea cable security risk as a telecom problem when it is a board-level liability.

Europe wants to triple its nuclear capacity by 2035. But the uranium will come from mines it doesn't control, converted in facilities it can't replicate, and enriched by a competitor it's trying to decouple from. The framing error boards are making: treating nuclear fuel as a procurement line item when it is a supply-chain architecture with a binding constraint two layers below.

Most corporate exposure models in the Indo-Pacific are built on a binary premise: Taiwan is either at war or it is not. That premise is wrong. China is altering the status quo by increments — each below the threshold of armed conflict — while security, commercial and diplomatic architectures re-align simultaneously. July 2026 is the month these vectors converge. The boards still waiting for a clear signal to reprice their exposure are already behind the curve.