All Reports

Federal control of Mekelle is confirmed, but the war did not stop with the fall. Abiy's short-war bet now meets a fragile economy, a hardening Red Sea front — and overnight strikes that prove the longer war has begun.

As the Kordofan Sudan offensive 2026 cracks Al-Mazroub and opens the road to Darfur, the UN Security Council races its 9 October deadline to vote on a nationwide arms embargo.

Taiwan's first F-16V delivery arrived 2 October — 2 of 66 jets, three years behind schedule — into the quietest PLA air activity since 2024. The signal isn't the aircraft: it's Beijing's silence, and the punishment exercised only when Washington moves next.

A fatal BSF encounter on the Punjab international border — the first lethal incident outside Kashmir since the May 2025 ceasefire — is testing crisis-management architecture that was never built for this frontier. The guardrails hold on the Line of Control; the Punjab border runs on legacy policing procedures, and both governments are pre-writing the record of the next encounter.

Robots made ground cheap around Lyman; Moscow's answer makes cities costly. As Kyiv doubles its refinery campaign, the fifth winter becomes an endurance race between two collapsing infrastructures.

The 29 September 2026 inauguration of the China-Laos Military Joint Support and Training Center gives Beijing three disclosed overseas military outposts — and its first centred on air power. This assessment maps the continental arch from Laos to Cambodia to Myanmar, the debt substrate financing it, and the operational risk vectors for organisations with Mekong-corridor exposure.

Updated 3 Oct 2026 — Ethiopia was not destabilised in 2026; it fractured: seven armies allied in September, at war by the 23rd, severed from Eritrea and Egypt by the 1st of October. Our August stagnation scenario is dead; the updated assessment runs three scenarios to mid-2027, from federal containment to a regionalised cascade.

Updated 3 Oct 2026 — Taiwan was not invaded in 2026; it was encircled: quarantined from June, tested through September's stalemate summit, and priced by an insurance market that can read a coast guard patrol as accurately as a missile. Our August grey-zone momentum scenario has held; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through Q4 2027.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — Pakistan was not destabilised in 2026; it was leveraged: sworn into the Mecca pact in August, tested by Houthi strikes in September, and held together by a mediation it cannot exit. Our threshold-state framework holds; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through the 2027 fighting season.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — The Mecca Defence Pact 2026 institutionalised in eight weeks, then failed its first test in ninety. Istanbul's committee meets, Riyadh's secretariat staffs, but the Article 5 clause never fired when Houthis burned Jazan again. Our hedging scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three rebased scenarios for Q4 2026–Q3 2027.

Updated Oct 1, 2026 — The Philippines was not attacked in 2026; it was worn down: baton-struck in July, obstructed by navy warships in September, governed by an elite too consumed by impeachment to respond. Our August stress scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through Q2 2027.

Updated 1 Oct 2026 — The Ukraine Russia War 2026 did not freeze with the summer's diplomacy: it compounded. The Kremlin's end-of-year deadline for Donetsk is now assessed as missed; a fuel crisis once dismissed as episodic has become the war's decisive asymmetric weapon; and a Duma supermajority has been installed precisely to authorise whatever October requires. Our July forgotten-theatre thesis has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through the Q4 2026 m

Updated 30 Sep 2026 — The Strait of Hormuz was not closed in 2026; it was repriced: blockaded by underwriters in March, tolled by Tehran in August, and bypassed through a Bab el-Mandeb that has now physically fallen. Our July attrition-corridor scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through Q2 2027.

Updated 30 Sep 2026 — Yemen was not rescued in 2026; it was conquered without conquest: the coast seized, the corridor priced at 3%, the Mecca pact untested. Our August offshore scenario has moved into the air domain; the updated assessment rebases probabilities through Q1 2027.

Updated 30 Sep 2026 — The Bab el-Mandeb blockade did not close the strait; it nationalised it: Mocha and Perim seized in an 18-hour September blitz, war-risk premiums re-rated to 3–10 percent of hull value, the Saudi East-West pipeline repaired to half its surge capacity. Our July taxation-regime scenario has come true; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the H1 2027 planning horizon.

Sweden and Finland's NATO accession did not end Nordic security — it inverted it. This 2026 assessment maps the Northern Front: shadow fleets, cable sabotage, Gotland, defence budgets, and the American variable no ally controls.

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — Lithuania was not reassured in 2026; it was repositioned: the US rotation gap opened in June, the first drone shootdown occurred in September, and five percent of GDP now finances a deficit with no expiry date. The July hybrid-deterrence scenario has crystallised; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for Q4 2026 through the 2027 posture review.

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — The DRC was not stabilised in 2026; it was auctioned: partitioned in the east, indebted to Washington, mortgaged to Moscow, and governed by a leader rewriting the constitution he swore to uphold. Our July fragmentation scenario is now the baseline; the updated assessment runs three scenarios for the Q2 2027 window — referendum, withdrawal, and the fastest-growing Ebola outbreak on record.

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — Sudan was not divided by the war; it was reorganised by it: partitioned in practice since 2025, drone-contested since September, and now the endpoint of a Hormuz-bypass energy map it cannot defend. Our army-momentum inversion is underway; the updated assessment runs three scenarios through mid-2027.

Updated 21 Sep 2026 — Iraq was not stabilised in 2026; it was decompressed: the militia disarmament deadline dissolved in August, oil recovered into a re-closed Hormuz, and the state now pays salaries late. Our managed-fragmentation baseline has become the living trajectory; the updated assessment runs three scenarios from the September US withdrawal through the 2028 political cycle.